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THE EXECUTION OF WILLS*
A. J. WHITE HUTTON
END THEREOF

The Wills Act of 1917, like that of 1833, stipulates that the will shall be
signed "at the end thereof." These words have been interpreted by the courts
in a series of interesting cases. In an early case 12 Gibson, C. J., explained that it was not essential that the different parts of a will be
physically connected but it was sufficient if they are connected by their internal
sense or by a coherence and adaptation of parts. Accordingly it was held' 13
that a will signed at the end of the obviously inherent sense, though not at the
end in point of space, complies with the requirement as "signed at the end
thereof." Here the will was written on the first and third pages of a sheet
of paper and signed at the end of the third page. Another application" 4 is
where the testatrix after writing the first page, passed the second and wrote
on the third, returning then to the second where the will was finished about the
middle of the page. The name of the testatrix then followed with the names
of the witnesses. This was a signing at the end as required by the statute.
Likewise' 15 a codicil was held to be signed at the end when the page contained
paragraphs from one to eight downward and near the bottom of the page appeared the name and seal of the testatrix and the usual attestation clause. Along
the entire left margin of the page four more paragraphs were added numbered
from nine to twelve inclusive. An issue was refused and on appeal the decree
was affirmed. Said Michell, C. J.:
"In the present case the connected sense of the text is entirely
clear, though it does not follow the usual order of arrangement.
But it does not deviate from it more than many letters written in
the style of the present day when the writing jumps from the first
*Continued from the October, 1942 issue, vol. 47, p. 44. Being part of the revised edition
of Hutton on Wills, to be published by Soney and Sage. All rights reserved by A. J. White Hutton
and Soney and Sage.
ll2Wikoff's Appeal, 15 Pa. 281, 53 Am. Dec. 597 (1850).
13
1 4 Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa, 381, 52 Am. Rep. 478 (1884).
l' Stinson's Estate, 228 Pa. 475, 77 A. 807, 30 L.R. A. n.s. 1173, 139 Am. Rep. 1014 (1910).
115Swire's Estate, 225 Pa. 188, 72 A. 1110 (1909).
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to the third page and then back to the second. The full substance
of the testatrix's intent and its expression are there, and the signature is at what she intended and regarded as the end of her will.
When that is manifest the continuity of sense and not the mere position on the page must determine the statutory 'end thereof' as the
place for the signature."
The courts have been liberal in not requiring the testator's signature to be
in immediate juxtaposition to the end of the dispositive matter of the will. In
one case1 16 the granting parts were all on one page and at the top of the
reverse side was written the usual attestation clause, followed by the
words, "Witness my hand and seal," and the decedent's name. It was held
that the interposition of a blank space between the dispository portion of the
will and the testator's signature was not material and hence the decree admitting
the will to probate was affirmed. Quoting from Hawkins, J., of the lower
court, it was said:
"Who shall undertake judicially to say that the subscription
shall be one-eighth of an inch, one-half of an inch, two inches,
or ten inches from the last line of the instrument? The distance
from the last line has not been fixed by statute. The place named
by the statute is the end."
In another case"' the will was declared validly signed when the name appeared at the bottom of the second page otherwise blank.
However, the signature must be placed at the end of the will and this must
be on a page of the instrument so that there is a necessary connection with the
dispositive portion by internal sense or by a coherence and adaptation of parts.
Consequently, there was no valid execution when the names of the
testator and witnesses were placed on the folded back of the will,
there being thus no cnnnection whatsoever between the parts of the instrument
and the signature. 118 Likewise the will was held not properly signed where
testatrix signed her name in the attestation clause of a printed form of will. 119
In another case also 120 a will proper in form but not signed at the end thereof
was held a nullity although decedent had inserted his name at various other
blank spaces on the document.
In another case' 21 an envelope left by decedent contained four loose
and detached papers, having the appearance of being cut from a will
previously made; one was in form an .introduction to a will, another was
numbered eight and contained testamentary directions, a third was an attestation
c.o's Estate, 204 Pa. 479, 54 A. 313 (1903).
7
'TBogat's Estate, 96 Pa. Super. 26 (1929).
116

''sDietterich's Estate, 127 Pa. Super. 315, 193 A. 158 (1937). Cf. Stinson's Estate, 232 Pa.
230, 81 A. 212 (1911).
l"9Bridge's
Estate, 139 Pa. Super. 606, 13 A. (2d) 125 (1940).
12 0Friese's Estate, 336 Pa. 241, 9 A. (2d) 401 (1939). And ,ee Stinson's Estate, 232 Pa. 230,
81 A. 212 (1911).

12ISeiter's Estate, 265 Pa. 202, 108 A. 614 (1919).
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clause in usual form and the fourth had the testator's name written thereon with
names of two other persons. One of these persons admitted that the signature
was his but the other could not be found. It was held there was no evidence
showing a complete will as the parts were loose, disconnected and unrelated
and there was nothing to comply with the requirement of being signed at the
end. A later case shows a somewhat similar situation and with the same result.1 2 2 In still another case" 5 codicils were placed in an envelope but not
signed. However, the envelope was 'endorsed with the decedent's name. It
124
was held the codicils were not signed at the end. Under very similar facts,
the papers were denied probate. Under a curious set of facts' 2 5 decedent had
a will prepared by a lawyer which was returned for certain corrections. These
could all be made on the third and last page which had likewise the testimonium
clause and space for names of testator and witnesses. The lawyer rewrote the
third page and in returning the will to decedent enclosed with it the old
third page for comparison. Decedent, evidently not noticing the difference,
signed, instead of the new one, the old third page which although enclosed was
from the will. It was held, per Stern, J., that the will was
actually detached
2 0
not executed.'
If the testator desires to revoke his will by another writing, the latter must
be signed at the end as required of a will. So an unsigned statement written
on the margin of a will in such a manner as not to touch any part of the
be destroyed," and giving the date, was
words thereof stating "this will to
27
revocation.'
a
as
invalid
b'e
held to
In a recent case," 8 there was a typewritten will offered for probate having
pencil lines crossing out the provision designating an executrix, and a paper
which was in testatrix's handwriting and executed by her designating an executor was pinned to the typewritten will. Likewise at the place where the residuary estate was mentioned, this disposition was crossed out by pencil lines and
a paper in the testatrix's handwriting but not executed and which provided for
a disposition of the residuary estate was also pinned to the will. It was held
that the original will plus the provision added designating an executor were
properly probated because the added paper concerning the executor was signed,
but in the case of the other paper providing for residuary disposition, such could
not be probated because it was not signed at the end thereof. This latter paper
was known as "Exhibit B" and concerning it Stern, J., observed:
2

12 Maginn's Estate, 278 Pa. 89, 122 A. 264, 30 A.L.R. 418 (1923) ; Magirn's Estate, 281 Pa.

514, 127 A. 79 (1924); Churchill's Estate, 260 Pa. 94, 103 A. 539 (1918); Taylor's Estate, 230
Pa. 346, 79 A. 632 (1911).
Estate, 18 D. & C. 111 (1933).
123Maxwell's
124 Koenig's Estate, 22 D. & C. 275 (1935).
2
12 5Bryen's
Estate, 328 Pa. 122, 195 A. 17 (1937).
l 6See Alter's Appeal, 67 Pa. 341, 5 Am. Rep. 433 (1871); Hagarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. 503
(1874).
2'lWilliam's Estate, 34 D. & C. 411 (1938).
llSBaker s Estate, 331 Pa. 33, 200 A. 65 (1938).
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"To permit the probate of such a paper as "Exhibit B" would
be to legalize a practice by which testators, instead of formally
executing codicils in the manner prescribed by the statute, could
pin unsigned scraps of paper to their wills, and later remove and
replace them at pleasure as their testamentary plans changed from
time to time. It would also enable evilly-disposed persons to pin
to the will of a testator fragmentary slips which he may have discarded or prepared only tentatively, or to remove similar pieces
which he had pinned thereto. Thus the way would be opened to
unbounded possibilities of fraud."
In another recent case 129 there were two sheets of paper offered as codicils
not firmly fastened together but typewritten except for the date "9th" inserted
by a pen in a blank space which had been left for the purpose. It was conceded that testator signed the paper in the presence of the subscribing witnesses
and the sufficiency of the proof of execution was admitted. The first sheet
was described as follows:
"A codicile to my last will dated February 11, 1937." Then followed certain changes in the will. The second sheet was described as follows:
"Continuation of codicilL of my last will dated February 11, 1937." Then
followed certain other changes in the will. The Court came to the conclusion that the papers were sb connected in their internal sense as to constitute
a single instrument and therefore entitled to probate being signed at the end
thereof which was on the bottom of the second sheet.
PROVISO
Section 2 of the Wills Act of 1917 differs from corresponding Section 6
of the Wills Act of 1833 in that the former has the following clause:
"Provided, that the presence of dispositive or testamentary words
-or directions, or the appointment of an executor, or the like, after
the signature to a will, whether written before or after the execution thereof shall not invalidate that which precedes the signature."
The following explanation is given of the above in the Report of the
Commission:"1 0
"The Commissioners, however, recommend in the proviso to
section
a change induced by the decision in Wineland's Apthis
peal, 118 Pa. 37.1s1 The legislative requirement that a will shall
be signed at the end thereof, the natural and proper place for the
signature, was a judicious improvement upon the law as it previously existed; but the Commissioners are of opinion that the
presence of testamentary provisions after the signature, even if
written before the signature is affixed, should not invalidate what
the testator by his signature has authenticated."
12 9 Rosenthal's Estate, 339 Pa. 488,

15 A.(2d) 370 (1940).
l3 0 Report of the Commission, 1917, p. 57.
13'Wineland's Appeal, 118 Pa. 37, 12 A. 301, 4 Am. St. Rep. 571 (1880).
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In Wineland's Appeal,132 the signature of the testator appeared between the last
disposing clause and a subsequent clause appointing an executor. There was
no evidence on the face of the document or aliunde to indicate whether the
clause appointing the executor was an addition or whether it was there at the
time the signature was placed. Consequently, the will was denied probate because of lack of evidence to show it was signed at the end thereof.
On the other hand, where a testatrix signed and executed her will at the
end thereof and on a subsequent day added an additional clause appointing an
executor but did not sign such clause, 13 it was held that the added clause was
to be regarded as inoperative either to appoint an executor or to affect the
will as originally signed and hence the testatrix was deemed to have sign'ed her
will at the end thereof. 1 4 In view of the proviso these questions no longer
arise, for irrespective of time, whatever precedes the signature is entitled to probate if it is of testamentary character.1a 6
ASSISTANCE IN SIGNING
38

the testator gave instructions concerning his will, being
In an early case'
very ill at the time. When the scrivener returned with the written will, the
testator was found speechless and senseless. Nevertheless, h'ewas held up in
bed and a pen placed in his hand while another directed the hand in the making of a mark. The will was not read to the testator for it would have been
useless as he could not understand anything at the time. However, later the
testator revived and requested the will read to him, which being done he approved and also ratified the execution of the will. In reversing the judgment
of the lower court in favor of the will, Gibson, C. J., declared that the attempted execution was clearly invalid and no subsequent ratification would give
it validity. Likewise in Stricker v. Groves'3 7 where the decedent by reason of
an infirmity of the hands was unable to write but directed others to sign for
him and they refused to do so from misapprehension of the law, the holding
was that the refusal, however unreasonable and accompanied by futile exertions
upon the part of the testator, did not constitute compliance with the law. However in the matter of assistance rendered testator the courts have been more liberal. In an early case138 it was stated:
"If one having testamentary capacity is unable from palsy
or other cause to steady his hand so as to make to his will the- sinature required by law, another person may hold his hand and aid
1821dem.
1334 Saunders v. Samarrey Co., 205 Pa. 632, 55 A. 763 (1903.).
13 Hays v. Harden, 6 Pa. 409 (1847); Heise v. Heise, 31 Pa. 246 (1858); Baker's Appeal,
107 Pa. 381 (1884); Taylor's Estate, 230 Pa. 346 (1911).
135Cf. Dietterich's Estate, 127 Pa. Super. 315, 193 A. 158 (1937) ; Bridge's Estate, 139 Pa.
Super. 606, 12 A. (2d) 125 (1940); Rosenthal's Estate, 339 Pa. 488, 15 A. (2d) 370 (1940).
l'6Dunlop v. Dunlop, 10 Watts 153 (1840).
1375 Wharton 386 (1839).
l88Vandiuff v. Rinehart, 29 Pa. 232 (1857).
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him in so doing; and it is not necessary to prove any express request from the testator for such assistance. The act is his own
with the assistance of another, and not the act of another under authority from him."
In a somewhat later case, 139 a testator was paralyzed and said he was unable to write but he would put his mark to his will; accordingly, he was raised
in bed, a pen was put into his hand which was held by another, whilst he made
his mark. This was a valid execution of the will and the act was that of the
testator with the assistance of another and not the act of another under the
authority of the testator.
In a more recent case, 140 it was held to be proper for a bystander to steady
the testator's hand while the latter was writing his name to the will. In this
case, the testator was a man of ninety-one years of age and shown by the testimony of his family physician and others to have been normal and rational at
the time of the execution of the will although physically infirm.
In another recent case,' 41 testatrix had been blind for some years and had
been confined through illness to her home a few days before the will was executed. When about to place her signature on the document she called in her
brother, William, the principal beneficiary, to assist. He placed his left arm
about her wrist, raised her in bed and with his right hand placed over her
hand wrote her name. Thereafter the subscribing witnesses attested the will as
just indicated.
In affirming the judgment of the court below entered n. o. v. for the
plaintiff on an issue d. v. n., Kephart, J., said:
"Whether a testator can write at all makes no difference in
determining the validity of a will, nor does it matter whether he
is so stricken that he cannot write, or can write only with difficulty. Where testator's mental conception is entirely clear and he
desires to sign the will, but his physical powers unassisted will not
permit it, and such assistance is called in, the incident of assistance
becomes immaterial so long as there is a conscious wish of the
testator that his hand should make the signature. His participation
in the slightest degree or acquiescence in or adoption of the signature is sufficient: McClure v. Redman, 263 Pa. 405, 411, 412;
Fritz v. Turner, 46 N. J. Eq. 515, 22 Ati. 125; Kearney's Will,
74 N. Y. S. 1045. Therefore, it makes no difference whether this
will was signed by Mary Brehony herself with the aid of her brother, or by William Brehony at her request, as long as the signature
was adopted and legal proof is present: Hughes's Est., 286 Pa.
466, 469, et seq.
On the other hand in another recent case' 42 the facts were very similar but
I2 9Cozzen's Will, 61 Pa. 196 (1869).
14OHopkin's Estate, 277 Pa. 157, 120 A. 807 (1923).

14'Brehony v. Brehony, 289 Pa. 267, 137 A. 260 (1927).
142MCClure v. Redman, 263 Pa. 40., 107 A. 25 (1919).
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the essential difference between the two cases was on the matter of the proofs.
In the former, 43 Kephart, J., explained:
"Therefore, when the two subscribing witnesses in this case
testified they were present and saw Mary Brehony affix her name
at the end of the will on the date on which it purports to have
been executed, and heard her declare that it was her will, and that
she knew what it was, asking them to sign it, a prima facie case
was made out; the execution of the will was so far established as
to cast on the contestants the burden of showing that it was not
executed: Lawrence's Est., 286 Pa. 58, 64; Logan's Est., 195 Pa.
282, 283."
Unfortunately for the proponent in the latter case 144 there was but one
witness and in view of the fact that the name of the testatrix as subscribed was
not her natural signature owing to the fact that she had to be so assisted,
the court characterized the act of execution as the joint effort of the testatrix
and another, and as to just how much each contributed to the formation of the
ltters of the signature, would be a matter of pure speculation. Therefore it
was held that the rule of Hays v. Harden 45 would not be applicable allqwing
circumstantial proof to supply the statutory requirement where at the execution
of the will but a single witness was present.
PUBLICATION

By publication is meant the declaration by the testator that the paper in
question is his will. The usual opening of a formally drawn will is:
"I, John Doe, do hereby make, publish and declare this my last
will and testament."
At one time in England, the courts interpreted the statute as requiring such
publication in the presence of the witnesses. It was finally determined that
146
publication was not required. Some of our states so require, others do not.
In Pennsylvania it was early decided that the testator did not have to declare
to the witnesses that the instrument was his will 1 7 and the witnesses did not
have to know the contents. Furthermore, the witnesses are not required to know
that the testator knew the contents of the will.' 48 As will be discussed hereafter our statute does not require subscribing witnesses but it does specify that
14

3See note 141, supra.
144See note 142, supra.
1486 Pa. 409 (1847).

146See ROOD ON WILLS. (2ncd ed., 1926) sec. 276, et seq. It is pointed out that twelve states
require publication, notably New York and New Jersey. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania along
with others do not.
147Grinder v. Farnum, 10 Pa. 98 (1848); Comb's Appeal, 105 Pa. 155 (1884); Kisecker's
Estate, 190 Pa. 476, 42 A. 886 (1899) ; Lillibridge's Estate, 221 Pa. 5, 69 A. 1121, 128 Am. St.
Rep. 723 (1908).
14SLinton's Appeal, 104 Pa. 228 (1883).
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two witnesses are necessary to prove the execution of a will and the ruling is
that each witness must separately depose to all facts necessary to complete the
chain of evidence, so that if only one witness were required the will would be
fully proved by the testimony of either.149 Although the requirement of publication may be dispensed with when the will is obviously testamentary in character and all that is necessary is to prove the signature by two witnesses, yet if
the instrument is equivocal in character, it is necessary by the required proof
to show some publication on the part of the decedent indicating that it was his
intent that the document as offered was to be considered a will. In one
case,150 the paper offered as a will was in the form of a letter to the decedent's
attorney giving him instructions as to the preparation of a will. It was held
necessary to show by the required proof that the decedent declared the paper
to be his will. Another illustration is where1 51 the attempt was to have probated as codicils seven judgment notes that had been executed by the decedent.
There was no doubt about the signatures to the notes but it was held that the
problem was to prove the notes were codicils to a will. This could not be done.
Consequently, publication, as it appears, may be a very essential element in the
proving of a will. In the usual ceremony of execution of a will no careful
lawyer should fail to bring out a publication of the will by the testator stating
to the witnesses that it is his will, as well as the observance of having at least
two subscribifig witnesses.
PROOFS OF WILLS

Both the Acts of 1833 and 1917 declare in identical terms:
"Every will shall be in writin.g . . .signed at the end thereof, and proved by152the oaths or affirmations of two or more competent witnesses."
It is noteworthy that the statute prescribes proofs as to the will and not merely
as to the signature. However, if the paper propounded is obviously testamentary in character, the rule of res ipsa loquitur applies and proof of the signature
is sufficient. If the signature has been subscribed by the testator himself and
in the presence of the witnesses, the testimony of such constitutes the best evidence. However, the signature, if characteristic as the name written by testator
or some peculiar symbol or sign customarily adopted by testator so affixed or
subscribed by him, may have been placed on the will by him and yet there were
no witnesses present when it was done. The statute does not require subscribing witnesses; therefore, in the absence of such, witnesses must be called who
are familiar with the testator's signature and are able to express an opinion as
149Hock v. Hock, 6 S.& R. 47 (1830); Derr v. Greenawalt, 76 Pa. 239 (1874); Comb's
Appeal, 105 Pa. 155 (1884).
150Scott's Estate, 147 Pa. 89, 23 A. 212 (1892).
151Sunday's Estate, 167 Pa. 30, 31 A. 353 (1895).

152 Sec. 2, Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403, 20 P.S. 191.
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to its genuineness. The statute does not specify that there shall be subscribing
witnesses, although invariably wills drawn by professional hands provide an
attestation clause to be subscribed by the witnesses. This is in conformance
153
with the practice under English statutes, and those of most American States,
but our statute is peculiar by reason of the absence of any requirement concern154
ing subscribing witnesses.
Witnesses to a will, exclusive of subscribing witnesses, are of two kinds:
(1) persons who were actually present and saw the testator execute his will
under one or the other modes as prescribed by law and already discussed, (2)
persons who were not present at the time of the execution of the will, but who
are qualified to express an opinion as to the genuineness of the signature attached to the will and which is alleged to be that of the testator.
In the first class, the witnesses testify as to their sense perceptions, viz.,
what they observed, perceived and discerned; whereas, in the second class, the
witnesses testify as to their opinions rather than to the facts concerning the
handwriting or signature affixed to the document stating whether it is genuine
or spurious, the opinion being based on familiarity with the handwriting of the
decedent. If testamentary capacity is at issue, both classes may testify, but again
in the first class the witnesses are testifying as to their sense perceptions, where155
as in the second, the testimony is based solely on opinion.
Two WITNESS RULE

The statute declares that the proof must be "by the oaths or affirmations
of two or more competent witnesses." At common law there is no specification
as to the number of witnesses necessary to prove a fact. Therefore, one witness, if believed, may suffice. The two witness requirement is an adoption
from civil law sources. In a recent case 15 Linn, J., refers to "the rule recently
applied in several cases and stated long ago by Gibson, J.,"as follows:
"Proof of execution must be made by two witnesses, each of
whom must separately depose to all facts necessary to complete the
chain of evidence, so7 that no link in it may depend on the credibility of but one.""6
In other words, assuming there were five points to be proved in order to
make a complete set of proofs, each witness must testify as to the five points to
complete the set. It would not suffice if one witness testified to three points
163Rood ON WILLS, (2nd ed., 1926) sec. 286.
54
l Sec. 6, Wills Act, 1917, amended, Act of July 2, 1935, P.L. 573, and Act of May 16, 1939,
P.L. 141, 20 P.S. 195, supplement.

155 See MOORE, FED PR., vol. 1, p. 548 for discussion concerning the pleading of facts and

quoting the following definition from MICHAEL AND ADI:ER, "THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PRooF."

(1931), "A scientific definition of a fact is any determinate entity which has a determined place in
the order of existence."
16Orlady v. Orlady, 336 Pa. 369, 9 A. (2d)
1B7Hock v. Hock, 6 S. & R. 47 (1830).

539 (1939).
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and the other to two points, making a total of five points.
plained:'5 8

Stewart, J., ex-

"It is an established rule that each of the two witnesses required for the proof of a will must depose to all facts necessary
to complete the chain of evidence in order that no link in it may
depend on the credibility of one; so that if one witness was only
required the will would be proved by the testimony of either.
When the evidence of both is circumstantial each must make proof
complete in itself, so that if the Act of Assembly were out of the
question, the case would be well made out by the evidence of
either: Hock v. Hock, 6 S. & R. 47; Derr v. Greenawalt, 76 Pa.
239.'"
In this case there was but on witness of class one, also subscribing, and
the attempt to supply the other was by offering testimony of an expert in handwriting, thus a witness from class two. But the signature of testatrix was not
susceptible of this kind of proof, for on the facts it was the product of the combined efforts in writing of testatrix and the other witness who had assisted her.
It was not a customary or characteristic signature. The proofs were not sufficient. In a like case' 59 the facts as to actual execution were quite similar to
McClure v. Redman 16 0 but there were two subscribing witnesses to testify to
the essential facts as to the signing by the testatrix. The proofs were sufficient. In an early case 16 ' Gibson, J., elaborating on the rule as laid down, explained:
"When the evidence is positive there can be no difficulty,
for the witnesses then attest the simple fact of execution itself;
but when the evidence of one or both is circumstantial, each must
make proof complete in itself, so that if the Act of Assembly were
out of the question, the case would be well made out by the evidence of either. Circumstantial proof cannot, therefore, be made
by two or more witn'esses alternating with each other, as to the
different parts of the aggregate of circumstances which are to
make up the necessary sum of proof: the 'evidence of each, not
going to the whole."
In a late case,162 Frazer, J., observed that when the paper was testamentary in form and met the legal requirements necessary to constitute a valid will,
save the signatures of subscribing witnesses, this lack could be supplied by circumstantial proof of witnesses, both expert and nonexpert, giving opinions as
to the authenticity of testator's signature, their competency to testify first being
established. In an earlier case 168 there was one subscribing witness to a will
158McClure v. Redman, 263 Pa. 405, 107 A. 25 (1919).
159Brehony v. Brehony, 289 Pa. 267, 137 A. 260 (1927).

160263 Pa. 405 (1919).
161
Hock v.Hock, 6 S.& R. 47 (1830).
162 Ligo v. Dodson, 301 Pa. 124, 151 A. 694 (1930).
16lCarson's Appeal, 59 Pa. 493 (1868).
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signed by mark competent to testify as to the facts. The other witness had been
asked to subscribe but could not do so, not knowing how to write. He testified however that he saw testator execute a will which he believed was the one
offered for probate, although he had no way to identify it. He said the mark
also looked like the one he saw testator make and that he saw the subscribing
witness sign. Further, he never heard of any other will as made by testator.
There was no contradictory evidence or proof that the testator had made another
will. It was held the will was properly proved."'
Not only must the execution of a will be proved by the two witnesses, but
as already pointed out, there may be circumstances requiring proof of other
165
parts of the will as illustrated in the peculiar facts of Derr v. Greenawalt,
where the will was duly proved to have been executed in the presence of two
witnesses but with a blank left for the insertion of the name of the residuary
legatee. The proofs on this point were by one witness who testified that the
name was inserted in the presence of the testator and by his direction. However, the person who actually inserted the name could only testify that he wrote
it but had no recollection whether he did so by the direction of the testator or
in his presence. This deficiency in proof was held not to be supplied by evidence of the subsequent declarations of the testator that the person named was
his residuary legatee, and the further fact that the will continued a long time
afterward in the possession of the testator. Sharswood, J., applied the rule of
Hock v. Hock166 and made this comment:
"The rule is a simple, intelligible one, but the difficulty in
this, as it has been in other cases, is in its application. It is not
easy for the mind to divest itself of the influence which facts sworn
to by one witness have in corroborating the evidence of another,
especially of supplying what is a mere vacuum-a failure or uncertainty of memory in another. This difficulty is well illustrated
by the evidence in this case. The evidence of Mrs. Huber was
direct and positive that her son, George Rise, wrote the name in
the blank in the presence of the testator and by his express direction. Striking out the entire testimony of Mrs. Huber, is there
sufficient evidence from other witnesses in the cause which would
justify the submission of that fact to the jury? George Rise was
unable to testify that he had inserted the name by the direction of
the testator or in his presence."
Simrell's Estate1" 7 affords another example of the proving of the will, rather than the execution, where the two witness rule was applied. After the will
was executed and subscribed the daughter of testatrix made some erasures on the
will at the direction of her mother. There was no republication or re-execution
16 4Note opinion Sharswood, J., in Carson's Appeal, 59 Pa. 493 (1868)
away of the statute by the admission of circumstantial evidence.
16576 Pa. 239 (1874).
1666 S. & R. 47 (1830).
167154 Pa. 604, 26 A. 599 (1893).

deploring the paring
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and the subscribing witnesses testified that the will had no erasures when they
attested, and no witness aside from the daughter was produced by proponents.
It was held that the will in its original form was the only valid disposition. A
169
similar situation and result are found in Charles v. Huber.16 8 In a later case
the execution was proved by three witnesses but the question was whether the
paper was actually a will, being in the form of a letter of instruction. The proof
that it was intended by decedent to be a will was supplied by the scrivener who
was present at the signing and who testified to the declarations of decedent,
also by the son who, although not present at the execution of the paper and
not having seen the same at the time of the declarations, nevertheless being in
and about at the time, his- testimony was held admissible along with that of the
scrivener as to the publication of the paper by the decedent as a will. 170 In
another case 1 ' when it was sought to probate a lost will by parol proof of its
once existence, the court was emphatic in the position that the fact of execution
172
must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses. Likewise in a recent case
where the attempt was also to establish a lost will, it was stated that the proofs
must be strict and complete and circumstances may not supply lack of second
witness' testimony as to execution and contents, to which there is but one competent witness. Said Schaffer, J.:
"Wills differ from all other documents. By statute and
judicial decision they are put in a class by themselves in order as
far as possible to safeguard their integrity. One of the reasons
for this is that the person most concerned about a will cannot
come forward to defend it . . . Section 2 of the Wills Act (20
PS 191) provides that 'every will shall be in writing.., signed
• . . at the end thereof; . . . and, in all cases, shall be proved by
the oaths or affirmations of two or more competent witnesses;
otherwise, such will shall be of no effect.' A will is proved,
therefore, not by circumstances, but by the direct testimony either
of two witnesses who saw the testator sign it or by two witnesses
who are familiar with his signature and identify it."
Continuing, the learned justice quotes with approval from an earlier
case 178 the following:
"Proof of a lost will is made
and of contents by two witnesses
depose to all the facts necessary to
so that no link in it may depend
Hock v. Hock, 6 Serg. & R. 47."

out only by proof of execution
'each of whom must separately
complete the chain of evidence,
on the credibility of but one.'

10878 Pa. 448 (1875).
l0 9 Scott's Estate, 147 Pa. 89, 23 A. 212 (1892).
170C/. remarks of Sharswood, J., in Carson's Appeal, 59 Pa. 493 (1868).
171Michell v. Low, 213 Pa. 526, 63 A. 246 (1906).
17 2Harrison's Estate, 316 Pa. 15, 173 A. 407 (1934).
173Hodgson's Estate, 270 Pa. 210, 112 A. 778 (1921).
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It is believed by the writer that these recent statements of the Supreme
Court are sound in construction and policy and present a possible barrier to any
further encroachment upon the statute by way of circumstantial proofs, the fear
4
of which was expressed clearly by Sharswood, J., in Carson's Appeal.17
Non constat, keeping in mind that the Wills Act of 1917 requires the will
itself to be proved by the requisite number of witnesses and that proving of the
signature or the execution in some form or other is only a means of proving
the will, a situation might arise where there were no witnesses available who
could prove the fact of execution as being present at the time, no witnesses familiar with the handwriting of decedent and no admitted handwriting for comparison by experts. Yet the paper may have been found at such a place and
under such circumstances as to point almost conclusively that such was the product of the decedent and written by him. Would the testimony of two witnesses who found the paper be sufficient proof, relating the facts and circum175
stances of the finding?
SUBSCRIBING

WITNESSES

The importance of subscribing witnesses is apparent in the early cases t76
despite the fact that the statute did not require them. In one case'"7 Paxson,
J., observed:
"The signature of a subscribing witness to an ordinary instrument of writing implies nothing more than the instrument
was signed by the person whose act or deed it purports to be. It
is not so in the case of a subscribing witness to a will. His attestation is an assertion not only that the will was signed by the
testator, but of the further fact that the testator was of sound mind
when he executed it. It is said by Mr. Greenleaf, in his work
on Evidence, Vol. 2, page 691, that 'the attesting witnesses are
regarded in the law as persons placed round the testator, in order
that no fraud may be practiced upon him in the execution of the
will, and to judge of his capacity.' "178
Subscribing witnesses are deemed the "court's witnesses" as stated in Whitaker's
Estate'79 and as pointed out by Barnes, J., in Plott's Estate:'80
"Their attendance at the trial should be required by the court,
if necessary, upon the request of proponent or contestant. When
17459 Pa. 493 (1868).

7
1' Hays v. Harden, 6 Pa. 409 (1847) Gibson, C. J. explaining history of proving wills under
Act of 1705.
17GHays v. Harden, 6 Pa. 409 (1847); Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa. 151 (1848).
177Egbert v. Egbert, 78 Pa. 326 (1875), 3 Pitts. L.R. 358, 93 A.L.R. 1049-51 n.
178Cf. the strange situation disclosed in probate of will of Paxson C.J.: Paxson's Estate, 221
Pa. 98, 70 A. 280 (1908); Smith's Estate, 250 Pa. 67, 95 A. 338 (1915). Cases now obsolete by
act of July 2,1935, P.L. 573, 20 P.S. 195, supplement. See aso Spain's Estate, 327 Pa. 226, 193
A. 262 (1937).
1710 W.N.C. 139 (1881). See also James' Estate 329 Pa. 273, 198 A. 4 (1938); Szmahl's
Estate, 335 Pa. 89, 6 A. (2d) 267 (1939).
180335 Pa. 81, 5 A. (2d) 901 (1939).
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called to testify they may be freely examined and cross-examined
by both parties, without tither one being bound by any adverse
testimony given by such witnesses, as would be in the case of a
witness called as if upon cross-examination. The justification for
their presence at the trial of an issue to determine the validity of
a will may be found in the fact that they are competent to prove
not merely the execution of tht will, but that the testator was of
sound mind at the time it was signed, and they are subject to examination at length upon these essential questions in cases of this
character." 181
In an early case, 182 one of the subscribing witnesses was dead and his signature was proved which was held equivalent to his oath to the signature of
the testator. However, it was competent for contestant to show declarations of
this deceased subscribing witness that the testator was non compos at the time
the will was executed. Further, that when a subscribing witness expresses his
belief that testator was non compos at the time the will was executed, the party
calling him may contradict his evidence by reading his testimony given at a
former trial that testator was of sound mind and also by proof of his declarations to this effect at other times. 183
As already stated the subscribing witness is an attesting witness18 4 but according to our decisions an attesting witness must subscribe. 18 5 Although frequently wills are subscribed by the witnesses as such but without a formal attestation clause, it is desirable to have them sign such a clause. Itsets forth
that the testator has signed in the presence of the witnesses and the latter, at
the request of the testator, have signed in the presence of the testator and of
each other and that they attest these facts together with the fact that testator declared in their presence that the document was his last will and testament.
The type of subscribing witnesses will sometimes have a very profound
influence upon the court and jury in cases of will contests and there are numerous instances where it has been said that the will having been drafted and
witnessed by a reputable member of the legal profession, this fact and the
testimony of the lawyer will have great weight in the determination of the is-

18lEgbert v. Egbert, 78 Pa. 326 (1875) ; McNitt v. Gilliland, 246 Pa. 378, 92 A. 508 (1914).
182 Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa. 151 (1848).
183Subscribing witnesses repudiating testimony, subsequent statements to be received with
caution or eliminated. Wrestler v. Custer, 46 Pa. 502 (1864); Rice's Estate, 173 Pa. 296, 34 A.
835 (1896); Wertheimer's Estate, 286 Pa. 155, 133 A. 144 (1926); Plott's
Estate, 335 Pa. 89, 6
A. (2d) 267 (1939), where two of three subscribing witnesses testified they had affixed their names
to the will several days after death of testatrix and at request of proponent, admitting under crossexamination that they had sworn falsely before the Register of Wills; Porter's Estate, 341 Pa. 476,
19 A.
(2d) 731 (1941).
184
1n Swift v.Wiley, I B. Mon. (Ky.) 114 (1840) itissaid an attesting witness is one who
knows the will is published as such whereas a subscribing witness is one who merely subscribed for
purposes
of identification. See also, ROOD ON WILLS (2nd ed. 1926) p. 214.
185 See note 178, supra.
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sues involved. 18 6 Although Section 3 of the Wills Act' 17 does not require by
specific terms subscribing witnesses the methods of execution prescribed as well
as the signing by mark or by another under the provisions of Section 2 of the
Wills Act' 88 almost of necessity call for the subscription by witnesses. In the
early cases' 89 it was declared that the mark must be proved by the witnesses who
saw it affixed; and in Carson's Appeal'90 the mark was proved by a witness who
could not write, yet this situation is highly unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, it
would appear that when the identity of the will has been established, attesting
witnesses will suffice in the stead of subscribing ones. 191 Under both sections
the witnesses should be subscribing ones, and the scrivener should see to it that
all provisions are meticulously observed and that the attestation clauses subscribed contain the necessary averments that follow the terms of the resp ective
sections. If these precautions be observed, it would lessen litigation in the same
1 2
proportion as observing the traffic laws cuts down motor vehicle accidents.
CHARITIES PROVISION

Section 6 of the Wills Act of 1917 as amended

93

now provides:

"No estate, real or personal, shall be bequeathed or devised
to any body politic, or to any person in trust for religious or charitable uses, except the same be done by will at least thirty days before the decease of the testator, which period shall be so computed as to exclude the first and include the last day thereof; and
all dispositions of property contrary hereto shall be void and gc
to the residuary legatee or devisee, heirs or next of kin, according
to law."
The amendments eliminated the provisions requiring wills containing charitable gifts to be attested by two credible and disinterested witnesses and the
definition of the latter. The effect of this legislation is to render obsolete a
vast number of cases on the topics of attestation, credibility and disinterest of
witnesses. No longer are attesting and subscribing witnesses so required. The
will containing a gift to a charity is on the same plane as any other will, save
one exception, viz., it must be executed "at least thirty days before the decease
of the testator."
186Thompson v. Kyner, 65 Pa. 368 (1870); Kane's Estate, 206 Pa. 204, 55 A. 917 (1903);
Kustus v. Hager, 269 Pa. 103, 112 A. 45 (1920) ; Phillips' Estate, 299 Pa. 415, 149 A. 719 (1930) ;

Keen's8 TEstate, 299 Pa. 430, 149 A. 737
' Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403,
RS8Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403,
189 Engles v. Brinington, 4 Yeates
19059 Pa. 493 (1868).

(1930) ; Aggas v. Munnel, 302 Pa. 78, 152 A. 840 (1930).
20 P.S. 192.
20 P.S. 191.
345 (1807); Shinkle v. Crock, 17 Pa. 159 (1852).

19 1 Dunn's Estate, 3 D.R. 248 (1894); Carson's Appeal, 59 Pa. 493 (1868); Novicki v.
O'Mara,
280 Pa. 411, 124 A. 672 (1924); 13 Temple L.Q. 465.
19 2Drew's Estate, 32 D. & C. 297 (1938); Bobbitt's Estate, 30 D. & C. 659 (1937); James'
Estate, 329 Pa. 273, 198 A. 4 (1938); Hunter's Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 196 A. 35 (1938); Szmahl's
Estate,19 3335 Pa. 89, 6 A. (2d) 267 (1939); Cassel's Estate, 334 Pa. 381, 6 A. (2d) 60 (1939).
Sec. 6 of Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403, as amended by Act of July 2, 1935, P.L. 573, and
Act of May 16, 1939, P.L. 141, 20 P.S. 195, supplement.
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The fundamental statute on this topic was the Act of April 26, 1855194
and the necessity for such legislation was explained by Read, J., as follows:195
"Devises to charitable uses became so frequent in England,
particularly by languishing or dying persons, that the statute of
George II, Ch. 36, was passed, enacting, that after the 24th June,
1736, no lands, or money to be laid out in lands, or any interest
in lands, shall be given or conveyed for the benefit of any charitable use whatever, unless by deed executed in the manner prescribed twelve calendar months before the death of the donor or
grantor, and enrolled in the Court of Chancery within six calenar months from its execution."
The Act of 1855 covered both gifts inter vivos as well as gifts by will.
Therefore it was held 19 6 that a promise in writing to pay an amount of money
toward the erection of a church, without consideration, was void, the promisor
having died within one calendar month after the date of the promise. In
Irvine's Estate'1 7 Mestrezat, J., compares the terms of the Wills Act of 1833
with those of the Charities Act of 1855 but as already stated this comparison
is rendered obsolete by the amendatory legislation eliminating the requirement
of attestation by two credible and at the time disinterested witnesses.
In a recent case, 198 the will of testatrix containing a charitable bequest
was executed prior to the passage of the amendatory act but was not attested by
the required witnesses. Testatrix died after thL passage of the amendatory legislation leaving the will so unattested. It was held the gift to the charity was
valid, the statute providing that its terms should apply to wills of all persons,
dying on or after its effective date. The legislature could enlarge the power of
disposition by testatrix of property owned by her at death and could eliminate the
formality of attesting witnesses although the will was executed before the passage of the statute, no rights having vested before the death of testatrix. 199
RELIGIOUS OR CHARITABLE USES

In order to bring the gift within the inhibition of the statute it must have
been made "for religious or charitable uses." A religious purpose is a charit194Act of April 26, 1855, P.L. 328; Act of June 7, 1911, P.L. 702; sec. 6, Wills Act of
June 7,5 1917, P.L. 403, 20 P.S. 195, supplement.

19 Gables Ex'rs. v. Daub, 40 Pa. 217 (1861). Cf. McLean v. Wade, 41 Pa. 266 (1861).
196Gans v. Reimen-Snyder, 110 Pa. 17, 2 A. 425 (1885). Cf. Conrad's Estate, 341 Pa. 451, 19

A. (2d)

379 (1941); Groome's Estate, 337 Pa. 250, 11 A. (2d)

271 (1940); see also 10 P.S. 12.

197206 Pa. 1,55 A. 795 (1903).
l 9 8Spain's Estate, 327 Pa. 226, 193 A. 262, 111 A.L.R. 902. See dissent by Maxey, J.
199CI. Mullen v. McKelvey, 5 Watts 399 (1836); Taylor v. Mitchell, 57 Pa. 209 (1868)
Comp v. Clark, 81 Pa. 235 (1875); Packer's Appeal, 179 Pa. 580, 36 A. 344 (1897); Audenried's
Estate, 4 Pa. C.C. 128 (1887) ; 57 Am. St, Rep. 516, 14 L.R.A. n.s. 969n., 40 Cyc. 1076, 1131. For
the rule that the construction placed upon the language by the courts, shall govern as of time of
execution of will, Heath's Estate, 286 Pa. 335, 133 A. 558 (1926). Where instead of law being
changed testator changes domicile, the law of domicile at death governs validity of, execution of
will. Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N.Y. 396 (1861) per Denio, J., citing Desesbats v. Barquier, 1 Binn.
336 (1808) per Tilghman, J.
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able purpose but the language of the statute makes this decision unnecessary by
using both terms.2 00
In Jenning's Estate20 1 it was stated:
"Whatever is given for love of God, or for the love of your
neighbor, in a catholic and universal sense-given from these
motives and to these ends, free from the stain or taint of every
consideration that is personal, private or selfish, is a gift for charitable uses. The love of God is the basis of all that is bestowed
for His honor, the building up of His church, the support of His
ministers, the religious instruction of mankind. The love of his
neighbor is the principle that prompts and consecrates all the rest.
The current of these two great affections finally run together, and
they are at all times so near that they can hardly be said to be
separated."
In this case it was decided, inter alia, that a gift of certain gold articles, to be
converted into a chalice for the celebration of mass which is to be presented
to a designated church, is a charitable bequest and fails upon testatrix's death
within thirty days after the execution of the will.2 0 2
In Lawson's Estate20 3 Moschzisker, J., approved the following definition,
0
quoting from Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd:2 4
"A charity, in a legal sense, may be more fully defined as a
gift to be applied, consistently with existing laws, for the benefit
of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds
or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving
their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them
to establish themselves in life." 2 05
In a late case 2 06 testatrix left a bequest to an Odd Fellows Home for Aged
but died within thirty days of the execution of the will. Stern, J., held that
the gift was to a charity, howbeit a private as distinguished from a public one,
20 7
but within the statute and therefore invalid under the circumstances.
SCHULTZ'S APPEAL

2 08

Scarce twenty-one years after the passage of the Act of April 26, 1855200
a rule of construction of the act was adopted by the Supreme Court, which remains to this day despite the animadversions of eminent judges. Frederick
Schultz was very ill and sent for a scrivener to write his will which was duly
2OOMcLean v. Wade, 41 Pa. 266 (1861).

20120 D. & C. 506 (1934)

per Gangloff, P.J. (O.C. Schuylkill Co.) citing Price v. Maxwell,

28 Pa.
23 (1857) ; Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa. 292 (1866).
20

2Rhymer's Appeal, 93 Pa. 142, 39 Am. Rep. 736 (1880).

203264 Pa. 77, 107 A. 376 (1919).
204120 Pa. 624, 15 A. 552 (1888).
2 5
0 Historical Society v. Kelker, 226 Pa. 16, 74 A. 619, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010 (1909).
2 6
O Lowes Estate, 326 Pa. 375, 192 A. 405 (1937).
207Cf. Conrad's Estate, 341 Pa. 451, 19 A. (2d) 379 (1941). See generally, Honorary Trust
in Penna,, 42 Dickinson L.R. 161 (1938).
20880 Pa. 396 (1876).

209Act of April 26, 1855, Sec. 11, P.L. 332.
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drawn and executed September 6, 1872. The testator died September 13, 1872
leaving certain collaterals. He had expressed a desire to leave the bulk of his
estate to certain religious organizations but the scrivener advised that the will
would be inoperative as to such bequests, if Schultz died within thirty days, as
he eventually did. The suggestion was made by the scrivener that he could dispose of his estate by will unconditionally to some one, and if the latter would
see fit, he could apply the estate to the purposes the testator had wanted. After
this device was thoroughly explained the testator concluded to make Reuben
Yeagle, a bishop of his church, as the residuary legatee, absolutely. Yeagle did
not know of this arrangement, had no part in it, and learned the facts after
the testator's death. He promptly signified that he intended to carry out the
testator's wishes, although he understood that under the terms of the will the
residuary estate was his absolutely. The balance for distribution in the hands
of the executor was $10,043.57 and the auditor awarded the fund to Yeagle,
holding the gift absolute, unimpressed with any trust and that Yeagle was not
bound by any assurances given testator that he could be trusted to carry out his
wishes, not having been a party in any way to such arrangement. The orphans'
court overruled the exceptions to the auditor's report and entered a decree. This
was assigned for error in an appeal to thu Supreme Court. In affirming the
decree and dismissing the appeal, Sharswood, J., thus concluded:
"It is urged, however, that this whole plan is nothing but a
contrivance to evade the statute. No doubt such was the intention
of the testator. It is said that it is a fraud upon the law and that
the bequest ought therefore to be declared void. But that overlooks tht fact that the absolute property in the subject of this bequest has vested in the legatee, and that he is entirely innocent of
any complicity in the fraud of the testator. If the statute is practically repealed by this construction it is evident that it must be
for the legislature to devise and apply a remedy, not the judiciary,
whose province is not jus dare but jus diceri."
FLOOD v. RYAN

2 10

In this case the residuary clause was move elaborate than in Schultz's Appeal. In the latter the words were:
"As touching all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,
real, personal and mixed, I give, devise and bequeath the same
unto Reuben Yeakle, now of Cleveland, Ohio, and his heirs and
assigns forever."
In the former the language used was:
"All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed, I give, devise and bequeath unto St. Teresa's
Church, Broad and Catharine Streets, and St. Joseph's House for
Homeless Industrial Boys, on Pine Street, share and share alike,
210220 Pa. 450, 69 A. 908 (1908).
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provided, however, in case of my death within thirty days from
the date hereof, I give, devise, and bequeath all my said residuary
estate unto Most Rev. P. J. Ryan, Archbishop of Philadelphia, absolutely."
The action was ejectment by plaintiff as heirs at law of testator against
the defendant Ryan, who claimed title under the aforegoing clause of the will
duly probated, the testator having died within the thirty day period. It was
contended the gift violated Section 11 of the Act of April 26, 185511 and
was a palpable evasion of its provisions. The Archbishop testified that he did
not know the testator and had never heard of him before his death and that as
head of the church he held title to the diocesan property; also he was advised
that the property devised was to him absolutely and he could legally do with
it as his own, nevertheless he frankly stated that he was bound in the forum
of conscience to carry out the wishes of the testator and that he would do.
In following the precedent of Schultz's Appeal212 Brown, J. declared:
"The devise is understood by the appellee just as the law construes it-an absolute one-involving no legal duty to anyone
from him in the enjoyment of it; and this is the crucial test of a
trust. There can be no cestui que trust if there is no trustee to
be compelled by law to be faithful ...There is nothing in this
will to indicate that the devise to the appellee was to be in trust
for any religious or charitable use, on the contrary, from its face,
it appears that th'e testator, anticipating that the charitable disposition of his estate might fail, directed that if it should, his property was to go to an individual, 'absolutely,' and unimpressed with
any trust, instead of to charitable and religious uses." 213
To this legalistic casuistry, Mestrezat, J., in a dissenting opinion, inter alia, repli'ed:
"The question here, however, is not between a cestui que trust
and the trustee, nor does it involve the right of a cestui que trust
to enforce the provisions of a trust against a trustee. The question is whether the devise to Archbishop Ryan was in fact to him
individually or to him as trustee for the church and charity primarily given the property in the will, and therefore made to him
individually to evade the Act of April 26, 185.5, P. L. 328 ...The
will, therefore, read in the light of these facts, shows conclusively
that the residue of the testator's property was devised to the Archbishop with the intention, and the devisee so understands that it
shall be held and used for the church and charity named in the
will . . .The will itself shows the intention of the testator to give
the residue of his property to the church and charity named in
his will. The Archbishop, the devisee, admits that he holds the
property for such uses. Under his admission Archbishop Ryan
211p.L. 328.
21280 Pa. 396 (1876).
21SCf. Honorary Trustr in Pennsylvania, 42 Dickinson L.R. 161 (1938).
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would commit a fraud if he applied the property to his own use
and withheld it from the church and charity. His integrity and
high character are a positive assurance that he will not betray thl
trust reposed in him. The church and charity, therefore, get the
property, as intended by the testator, in plain violation of thL laws
of Pennsylvania."
BICKLEY'S ESTATE

214

In the last of this trilogy of decisions the result was the same on quite
similar facts but the dissidence was more articulate and emphatic, howbeit, futile.
The testator gave certain gifts to charities and then followed in the will
with this clause:
"Should I die within thirty days after the date of said will,
then and in that event, as to any provisions thereof which would
fail to take effect by reason of such decease, I give, devise and
bequeath that portion of my estate to Philip Mercer Rhinelander
of Philadelphia."
The legatee was the Bishop of the Protestant Church in the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. The lower court decided the gift was valid, the testator having died within the thirty days specified, and followed Schultz's Appeal and
Flood v. Ryan. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree, Simpson, J., delivering an opinion more distinguished for its caustic criticism of Schultz's Appeal
than its observance of stare decisis. The remarks of the learned justice, which
he was constrained to describe as "cogent reasons" were, totidem verbis, as follows:
"If the question involved was an open one with us, or if it
was of modern determination, we would reverse the decree in the
present case, for the following reasons: (1st) The decisions are
wrong in principle in that they make valid admitted attempts to
evade the public policy of the Commonwealth as expressed in her
statutes: nemo potest facere per obliquum quod non potest facere
per directum. (2d) In Kessler's Est., 221 Pa. 314, 320-1, summarizing previous decisions, we said: 'The Act of 1855 is a
remedial statute, and should be construed so as to give effect to
the purpose for which it was enacted. While charities may be said
to be favorites of the law, .

.

. yet the law discourages such gifts

at or near the time of impending death, when the mental faculties
are impaired, the will power broken and the vital forces weakened;
because, under such circumstances, the importunities of designing
persons, or the terrors of final dissolution, may induce dispositions of property contrary to natural justice, and without regard to
the ties of kinship, which, under normal conditions, would be operative on the mind of the testator.' These conclusions being correct, as indeed the act itself proclaims them to be, then the decisions now under consideration, and those of like effect elsewhere,
214270 Pa. 101, 113 A. 68 (1921).
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enjoy the unique and unenviable distinction of applying the law
to cases which are not within its spirit and purpose, and of refusing to apply it to those which are; for as to the wills of persons
made less than one calendar month before death, but while they
are in perfect health, 'when the mental faculties are (not) impaired,
the will power (is not) broken, and the vital forces (are not)
weakened,' all charitable gifts therein are void; whereas as to the
wills of persons in extremis, when the 'terrors of final dissoluiton' may control their every act, a lawyer or scrivener, often sent
for by attending spiritual advisers, will tell them how they may
successfully evade the statute and dispose of their estates to charitable and religious uses. In other matters it has been the proud
boast of our ancestors and ourselves throughout the centuries, that
'the reason the spirit of the law is the soul of the law,' 'for the
letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life,' 2 Corinthians 3:6. (3d)
They also tempt the legatee to commit grave moral wrong by retaining to his own use, money which he knows was not intended
for him. 'Lead us not into temptation' is a command of the divine law and also the basis of a large part of the statute law of
every civilized country; for he who tempts another to commit a
tort or a crime is as guilty, in the eyes of the law, and ofttimes
morally more guilty, than the man who commits it. If, in cases
like the present, the legatee resists the temptation, and pays the
legacy over to the charity for which it was actually intended, as
every man worthy of the name does, he knowingly assists in evading the law, and thereby to a degree is led to future wilful violations thereof. (4th) The lawyer, whose office calls upon him to
obey the law in letter and spirit, and the scrivener whose citizenship demands of him the same obedience, alike are tempted to
advise their clients how to evade the law, instead of how to obey
it; and the belief, sometimes stated, but more often acted upon
without expression, that it is all right to disobey the law if you
can avoid punishment for so doing, is seemingly approved by the
public generally, aided and abetted by the draughtsman whose
bank account is the measure of his conscience. Thus the tendency
is to debase the character of all those connected with such transactions, and there grows up in the community an inclination to obey
the law only when its arm is found to be too long to make disobedience safe; results which admonish us that error is necessarily
somewhere coiled up in these devisions. (5th) In all jurisdictions, the courts, tardily recognizing the consequences flowing
from their decisions allowing the law to be thus wantonly evaded,
have seized upon slight circumstances in order to create a trust
(Stirk's Est., supra; Russell v. Jackson, 10 Hare 204; Edson v.
Bartow, 154 N. Y. 199) and then have destroyed it in order to
give the estate to the heirs and next of kin, as the statute intended. This is itself potent proof of the law's recognition of the error of its position on the main question, and has resulted in illogical distinctions which have rendered uncertain the law on this
subject. In other cases the courts have not been swift to change,
by parol, written absolute estates into trust estates; nor would it
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be here were it not for the necessity of counteracting, as far as
may be, the evasions of the public policy of the State, recognized
yet approved by the earlier decisions."
The sole justification for following the earlier cases was stare decisis and
the fact that the legislature through the passage of the years had, by its inac215
tion, tacitly approved the court's construction.
The rule is still the law, unaffected by any later case, 216 or by legislative
action except the elimination of the attesting witness requirement by the Act of
July 2, 1935 and the defining of the thirty day period by the Act of May 16,
7
In Hartman's Estate 218 the drastic effect of the thirty day require1939.21
ment is dramatically illustrated. Testatrix had executed a will July 29, 1931.
On July 28, 1932 she executed a second will revoking the former and dying
July 29, 1932. Both wills contained bequests to charities essentially similar but
different in details and one was increased. It was contended the latter will was
a codicil to the former and parol evidence was admitted by the auditor to prove
that it was not the intention of testatrix or her desire to revoke the former will.
The court refused to sustain the auditor and the Supreme Court affirmed the
decree of the court below. Parol evidence is not admissible to show testamentary intention when the language of the will is perfectly clear and there is a
complete and plain will free from either latent or patent ambiguity. Said

Barnes, J.:
"The act must be literally read and construed, if affect is to
be given to the legislative intent, and cannot be stretched to save
a bequest clearly intended by the act to be void. Charitable or religious institutions, claiming bequests or devises, must bring themselves within it. As between them and the next of kin of a testator, there are no equities, and the rights of each are such only as
are given by the statute."219
In view of the recent amendments to Section 6 deleting the witness requirement and defining the thirty day period, and also in view of the state of
the decisions just reviewed, the question arises whether Section 6 in its present
form is really worthwhile. Putting the query in another way the question is
whether the retention of the thirty day clause has not already worked more
harm than good, as appears in Hartman's Estate.
A. J. WHITE HUTTON
Chambersburg, Pa.
January, 1943.
2t 5
See Opperman's Estate, 319 Pa. 466, 179 A. 735 (1935) for the rule that construction of
statute 6by the courts stands until legislature declares otherwise; 43 Dickinson L.R. 31 (1938).
21 Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 A. 85 (1938); Goleri's Estate, 20 D. & C. 535 (1934).
217See note 193, supra.

218320 Pa. 321, 182 A. 234 (1936).

21
9See list of cases cited by Barnes, J. following this quotation. Cf. Bingaman's Estate, 281 Pa.
497, 127 A. 73. On computation of thirty day period, see Act of May 16, 1939, P.L. 141, 20 P.S.

195 (#71), amending Sec. 6, Wills Act of 1917, P.L. 403; 34 D.L.R. 147. Cf. Act of May 16, 1939,

P.L. 141 (#70), repeating Sec. 11, Act of April 26, 1855, P.L. 328 and substituting similar provision to that of Act No. 71, supra.
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NO SCARECROW OF THE LAW
SOME THOUGHTS ON PUBLIC UTILITY RATE
LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA

SAMUEL GRAFF MILLER*
The Order Nisi and Final Order issued March 4, 1942 and December 7,
1942, by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,' regulating the rates of
The Peoples Natural Gas Company, dissipate many of the obscurities which have
impeded the symmetrical development of the law governing rate regulation.
Nearly every important rate case issue is comprehensively discussed and the succinct clarity of the discussion clearly reflects the culmination of long experience,
careful deliberation and constructive intent. The orders will speak for themselves to those who read them, but they suggest certain comments which it is the
purpose of this article to express.
In rate case deliberations, as in all fields of thought and reason, a danger
exists that essential truths may be pressed to the point of falsity. For example,
none can doubt the fairness and justness of the Smyth v. Ames2 doctrine that
unconscionable original cost, inflated by fraud, is unavailable as an exact measure of rate base value. But this doctrine loses its validity when rephrased in
attempted support of the use of estimated reproduction or current replacement
cost as the sole measure of value. The United States Supreme Court and our
Pennsylvania courts, recognizing this, have always carefully avoided promulgation of any exclusive rule or measure for fair value determination, and have
refrained from expanding the individual truths of various principles beyond
the scope of their application. It has been the consistent care of the courts to
emphasize that the circumstances of each case must determine the weight to be
given the diverse factors involved.
Usually, (and the Peoples cases were no exception) the utility contends for
exclusive consideration of physical property, claiming that it is the property and
not the cost which is taken if a rate order is confiscatory. The concept of property taking by rate regulation arose from the eminent domain precepts applied
in the early decisions in default of more pertinent legal principles. The courts,
confronted with a new problem, attempted to solve it by recourse to traditional
concepts. However, it was soon realized that capitalization of current incomea useful test of value in eminent domain cases--led the court in a circle when
applied in rate cases to determine proper future income. But when the circle
*A.B., Princeton University; LL.B., University of Pittsburgh; member of Indiana and Daut
phin County Bars.
The author holds the position of Assistant Counsel with the Pennsylvania Public Utility Comare his own.
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,Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Peoples Natural Gas. Co., 43 P.U.R. (N.S.) 82,

45 P.U.R. (N.S.)-.
2169 U. S.466 (1897).
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had been breached, the courts found themselves in a legal void which they
perforce proceeded to fill as best they could with such criteria as came to hand,
all in the name of "property."
It is obvious, if a moment's thought is given to actualities, that physical
property is never taken by any rate order. A rate order merely restricts income;
it does not confiscate property, except by legal fiction. Every utility retains actual ownership and possession and use of its property. It can sell or trade the
property or any part. Even if the property is held to have little or no value
for rate purposes, it may nevertheless have very great intrinsic or extrinsic market value, and practical economic considerations are far more germane to proper
decision of rate cases than are the heterogeneous theories which cluster round the
clouded head of the physical property confiscation concept. And the courts,
even while apparently applying the property concept, have usually blunted its
implications by cautious reservations. For, as the basic principles of rate law
gradually coalesce into the shape of equitable realism, it becomes apparent that
the courts have, for the most part, realized the perils of dogmatism on so elusive
a subject of economic justice, and have carefully insisted that all factors must
be considered in every case. This discreet course of the decisions has provoked
the printed ire of pet theorists and cloistered but articulate thinkers who prefer their law in neat capsules of specific formulas or rules, and it seems appropriate in the interest of fairness to take laudatory note of the judicial care
with which the courts have handled a subject which was originally entirely outside the settled precincts of the law. It is salutary to remember that rate regulation is still in a formative stage economically as well as legally, and that those
who presently proclaim ultimate dogmas of regulatory theory may share the fate
of the predecessors they excoriate. For the realm of rate economics offers a
most apposite instance of the apophthegm that "In the countries of the blind
the one-eyed are kings," and we may hope that the courts will continue their
endeavor to hold even the scales of constitutional justice without prescribing the
exclusive content of the scales.
An excellent example of judicial discretion appears in the case of Solar
Electric Co. v. Public Utility Commission,3 where the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, while refusing to permit the Commission to use an undepreciated original cost rate base, indicated that it was the failure to give any weight whatever
to reproduction cost and not the general reasoning of the Commission which
constituted reversible error. In fact, when the Court itself came to make its
own determination of fair value it specifically stated that, in addition to reproduction cost, it considered "the book cost of invested capital as shown on the
company's books." 4 Thus the Pennsylvania courts have left the Commission
free within thL ambit of reasonable discretion to comply with the Shakespearean precept that
3137 Pa. Super. 325, 9 A.(2d) 447 (1939).
41d. at 364, 9 A. (2d) at 469.
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"We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,
And let it keep one shape till custom make it
Their perch and not their terror." 5
And it is not through radical experiment that the Pennsylvania Commission has chosen to express its regulatory conscience. The Peoples orders clearly
show a purpose to rely upon lucid exposition of common sense principles within
the frame of law. Although the orders themselves avoid theory so far as possible, clarity of thought in analysis of the principles applied is aided by realis
tic appreciation of a basic cleavage between the concept of what is generally
termed "property" and the concept of "investment."
Selection of "property" or "investment" as the proper designation of the
item or thing to be valued will logically condition approach to any element of
fair value, including accrued depreciation, and also will condition ultimate exercise of judgment upon the elements as severally determined. If the "property"
-in the sole sense of physical property-is to be valued, then physical depreciation only can be consistently deducted, and no consideration whatever need be
given to the amount of dollars actually taken from the consumers for depreciation and booked in the depreciation reserve. Depreciation of "property" is
a physical matter. The depreciation of "investment" on the other hand, is a
matter of return of dollars. The "property" depreciates regardless of the collection of depreciation reserve dollars from consumers, or the use to which those
dollars are put. But every dollar of "investment" returned by the consumers
reduces the "investment."
Also, the distinction between "property" and "investment" is of supreme
importance in relation to annual depreciation. In the cases of Smith v. Illinois
Bell Telephone Co.,6 Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 7 and the recent
case of Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,8 the law is stated
to be that investment and the experienced relation of the depreciation reserve to
thee investment as represented by the book fixed capital control the annual allowance. Since the reserve is merely the total of the annual charges, consistency
demands that accrued depreciation be computed upon the same basis, although
no court has formally recognized this cogent logical necessity. Certainly no
logical distinction has ever been drawn justifying different bases of calculation for annual and accrued depreciation.
However, regardless of theoretical inconsistencies but adhering to the tenents
.of fair value, the Pennsylvania courts have emphasized that consideration must
be given not only to reproduction cost, 9 but also to factors such as investment,10
6

Measure for Measure, Act II, Scene I.

6282 U. S. 133 (1930).

7292 U. S. 151 (1933).
8315 U. S. 575 (1942).
9
Solar Electric Co. v. Public Utility Commission, 137 Pa. Super. 325, 9 A. (2d) 447 (1939).
lONew Street Bridge Co. v. Public Service Commission, 271 Pa. 19, 114 A. 378 (1921);
Matamoras Citizens Water Co. v. Public Service Commission, 86 Pa. Super. 152 (1926).
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in reaching a conclusion which fairly reflects the application of informed judgment to the evidence. The validity of this emphasis is shown by the following
tabulation illustrating the genesis of the more important rate base dilemmas confronting a commission.
ILLUSTRATIVE CHART OF HYPOTHETICAL UTILITY

Start of
Business
Invested Capital ................................ $100,000
100,000
Original Cost ...................................
Reproduction Cost New .................. 100,000
Book Fixed Capital .......................... 100,000
Expensed Property ............................
Book Depreciation Reserve ..............
Observed Depreciation ..........
Book Fixed Capital ..........................
(Less Depreciation Reserve)
Dividends (By Years) ....................
100,000
FA IR V ALU E ....................................

End of
First Year
$100,000

End of
Second Year
$100,000

105,000

110,000
120,000
110,000

1,000
5,000
5%
100,000

1,500
10,000
6%
100,000

7,000

7,000

105,000
110,000

??

Relevant Fair Value Points:
1. No increase in Invested Capital.
2. Depreciation Reserve used for capital additions.
3. What weight shall be given depreciation accruals as against observed
depreciation? Are the depreciation accruals really twice what they
should be?
4. What weight shall be given (a) Depreciated Reproduction Cost (b)
Depreciated Original Cost (c) Invested Capital (d) Book Cost less
Depreciation Reserve (e) Expensed Property?
It will be noted that reproduction cost, original cost and the book factors tally exactly when the business begins. Everyone must admit that, as of the
first year, the books of account truly and precisely reflect the actual facts. Let
us follow through and attempt to find where, if anywhere, the books lose their
validity.
The tabulation is almost self-explanatory. Is shows that managerial judgment adopted $5,000 per year as a proper annual depreciation accrual. As Mr.
Chief Justice Stone has said in the Natural Gas Pipe Line Company case, 1
"the purpose of the amortization allowance and its justification is that it is a
means of restoring from current earnings the amount of service capacity of the
business consumed in each year. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S.
151, 167. When the property is devoted to a business which can exist for only
11315 U. S. 575, 592 (1942).
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a limited term, any scheme of amortization which will restore the capital inVestment at the end of the term involves no deprivation of property. Even
though the reproduction cost of the property during the period may be more
than its actual cost, this theoretical accretion to value represents no profit to
the owner since the property dedicated to the business, save for its salvage value,
is destined for the scrapheap when the business ends. The Constitution does
not require that the owner who embarks on a wasting-asset business of limited
life shall receive at the end more than he has put into it."
The $5,000 annual depreciation accrual is shown as earned over and above
all operating expenses plus dividends of $7,000 (or 7 per cent) annually. At
the end of the first year everyone would determine net earnings by deducting
from gross revenues all operating expenses, including the $5,000 amortization
or depreciation amount. Thus the utility benefits from the annual depreciation
charge in the reflection of a lower net revenue for regulation and other purposes.
This does not impair the utility position in the financial field because it can
show that, in addition to paying substantial dividends, it has been able to provide liberally for return of its investment.
At the end of the second year, again net earnings are determined by deducting from gross revenues all operating expenses including the $5,000 amortization or depreciation amount, and the utility again benefits in the reflection
of a lower net revenue.
But we find that, even at the end of the first year, the original cost and
the reproduction cost have increased without any increase in the capital invested.
This situation is clearly ascribable principally to the purchase of addtional property with funds received from consumers and represented on the books by the
depreciation reserve figures or operating expenses. However, the mere fact
that reproduction cost, original cost, and invested capital are no longer identical
does not in any way impair the validity of the book figures nor imply that they
do not correctly represent important facts. As the Commission recognized in
the Peoples orders, all the indications of value should be studied, including the
recorded actualities as well as the expert estimates.
The topic of accrued depreciation also will be clarified by exemplification.
As we have seen, at the beginning of any utility enterprise, original cost, reproduction cost, and invested capital are identical. Again referring to the tabulation showing $100,000 as invested in creating a utility system, it appears that
the obligations of the consumers initially are clearly to pay a return upon a
rate base of exactly $100,000 under any theory, and to provide for a return of
$100,000 to th' investors over the useful life of the property, also under any
theory. In other words everyone knows, during the first year, precisely what
his rights and obligations are.
At the end of the second year, a total of $10,000 has been charged to operating expenses-$5,000 each year-and credited to the depreciation reserve.
Suppose $10,000 has been expended for additional property without any in-
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crease in investment, and no retirements have been made. We thus have original cost of $110,000, book cost of $110,000 and investment of $100,000.
A vital point is the source of the $10,000 expended for additional fixed capital.
Since it did not come from additional investment, it could only represent collections from the consumers. An inspection of the property discloses a 6 per cent
physical deterioration. But what shall be done about the actual cash dollars
represented by the depreciation reserve and the capital additions? If the utility
had kept the depreciation dollars in a separate bank account to be used for retirement recoupment,12 the dollars obviously could not have been used to purchase additional property and the question would not arise. The funds for the
additions would have been furnished as additional investment, and it would be
clearly proper to provide a return on and of the additional investment. But the
utility used the dollars dedicated to retirement recoupment for another purpose.
It is no part of the obligation of the consumer to provide funds for plant additions-that is the obligation of the utility investors. If the sums collected for
and dedicated to fulfillment of the consumer obligation to return capital investment are permitted to metamorphose into an accretion to the depreciation base,
clearly the consumer will never be able to fulfill this obligation. s
The Peoples' treasurer testified that, although some dollars allocated on the
books to depreciation reserve were used to purchase property, he did not know
and no attempt had been made to determine how many such dollars were so
used. The inequity of the situation was clearly demonstrated by the treasurer's
further specific testimony that the consumers would be expected to provide a
return and depreciation on the dollars so used. This amounted to saying that
dollars intended to recover or protect the investment and specifically and plainly dedicated by the utility to these purposes had actually been used by respondent to increase the plant and consequently the amounts needed each year for
return and depreciation with the obvious exaction of duplicate costs from consumers. 1'
The Supreme Court of the United States found occasion for succinct expression of the proper view in Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utilities Coinmission of Ohio,"5 saying that when an amortization fund has been computed
with reasonable liberality and is large enough to make provision for adequate
reserves, "If the company is not satisfied to have the depletion allowance thus
applied in renewal of its life, it may divide the fund among the stockholders
and wind the business up. It cannot get its capital back at the expense of the
consuming public and also at the same expense provide itself with a fresh supply to keep M/e business going." (Italics supplied).
Similarly, where property items are paid for with dollars collected from the
12

See City of York v. Public Service Commission, 85 Pa. Super. 139 (1925).

13
See
4

Railroad Commission of La, v. Cumberland T. & T. Co., 212 U. S. 414, 424, 425 (1909).
1 See Lindheimer v. Ill. Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. 168, 169 (1933).
15292 U. S. 398, 407 (1934).
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consumers and properly accounted for through maintenance or other operating
expenses, it is unfair and unjust to reaccount for the items and include the associated dollars in fixed capital accounts for rate case purposes. The dollars
having been duly provided by the consumers in the year of installation, should
not be demanded again.
Turning to examination of the discussions and findings in the Peoples'
orders we may usefully summarize (1) Reproduction Cost, (2) Expensed Property and Accrued Depreciation, and (3) Rates and Reparation.
1. REPRODUCTION COST

The Commission stated in the Order Nisi that "The element known as
reproduction cost is peculiar in that it is never factual, but an estimate based
upon an hypothesis," and approvingly quoted Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice)
Stone's comment.16 "Public utility properties are not thus created full-fledged
at a single stroke. If it were to be presently rebuilt in its entirety, in all probability it would not be constructed in its present form. When we arrive
at a theoretical value based upon such uncertain and fugitive data, we gain at
best only an illusory certainty."1 7 The Commission then pointed out that the
uncertainties, approximations and fictions attendant upon the reproduction cost
procedure made it pertinent to note that the expert witness sponsoring the reproduction cost estimate owned 102 shares of the stock of the utility's holding
company, Standard Oil Company (N.J.). In the final order, the Commission
reached its conclusion on this item in the words, "We do not believe that a
reproduction cost estimate standing alone, must be accepted at its face
value . . . ; nor do we believe that, standing with other evidence of value,
it must nevertheless be given the preponderant weight or, as respondent contends, the sole weight, in fixing fair value. The same is true of any other
opinion evidence."
2.

EXPENSED PROPERTY AND DEPRECIATION RESERVE

The Peoples company had claimed the expensed property and depreciation
charges as operating expenses over the years, thus reducing its taxabl'e net income
and the net income available for return. Having secured these very substantial
benefits year after year, the accounts were permitted to stand unaltered on the
books until the attempted impeachment for momentary advantage in the rate
cases. Success in the attempt would have stimulated similar efforts to adjust
accounts according to the whims and fancies of utility officials, and would have
impaired the integrity of both plant and income accounts.
Both with reference to expensed property and the depreciation reserve the
l 6 Dissent in West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 295 U. S. 662, 689 (1935).
the same
effect, see State v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., 284 N.W. 294, 310 (1939).
7
l In less formal phraseology "most rare vision....

To

a dream past the wit of man to say what

dream it was; a man is but an ass if he go about to expound this dream." (A Midsummer-Nights
Dream, Act. IV, Scene I).
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Commission emphasized that accounting entries originally made in accordance
with proper accounting principles by fully competent officials, attested by official oath, reflected in reports to taxing and regulatory bodies, as well as financial services and stockholders, duly audited year after year by certified public
accountants and relied upon by the Commission and all the other entities must
be accorded substantial weight in fair value determination. This view is clearly
correct, since the Pennsylvania Courts have not only required consumers to
amortize rate case expenses, even where the rates involved wre excessive, on the
theory that the Commission should have enforced reasonable rates currently
throughout the period of Commission supervision, 18 but have held in most
forceful terms that where the Commission has once fixed rates, no reparations
can be awarded, even upon a subsequent finding that the rates have become unreasonable.19
These considerations indicate the imperative necessity in the public interest
of holding utilities to strict accountability for their book figures. The books
and annual reports are the only consistently available sources of information and,
if they cannot be relied upon by the Commission, consistent and current regulation is impossible. 20
3.

RATES AND REPARATIONS

The Commission found that expenses other than for gas purchases were
closely comparable from year to year, and that the production from Peoples'
own wells was large enough to supply domestic and commercial needs. Considering these facts, together with respondent's repeated assertion that industrial
rates are fixed by competition with other fuels, the Commission fixed past rates
for domestic and commercial consumers as a percentage of the bills actually
paid by them, and required the establishment of future rates based upon a fixed
amount of revenues for a specified consumption.
There has been no opportunity within the confines of this article to do
more than indicate some of the problems of rate determination and adumbrate
the approach to those problems followed in the Peoples' orders. No attempt
has been made to cite even a substantial portion of the many court and commission decisions recognizing the validity of the principles applied by the Pennsylvania Commission, nor to deal in detail with the very important issues suggested by the discussion. If however, this cursory review induces the reader
to refer to the Peoples' orders it will fulfill the hopes of its author.
Harrisburg, Pa.
January 4, 1943

SAMUEL GRAFF MILLER

l198Solar Electric Co. v. Public Utility Commission, 137 Pa. Super. 325 (1939).

Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Public Utility Commission, 136 Pa. Super. 517 (1939) ; Penna.

R.R. Co. v. Public Utility Commission, 125 Pa. Super. 558 (1937); Cheltenham & Abington Sewerage 20Co. v. Public Utility Commission, 146 Pa. Super. 274, 344 Pa. 366 (1942).
See also Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 129 F. (2d) 126
(1942) for statement of importance of books in determining net investment.

